Iran threatened by the nigger over nuclear deal

These posts from trita parsi on twitter shows that the nigger in the white house is intent on war with Iran if they do not do as he says, and that the nuclear deal is essentially meaningless in preventing war.  There is no reason to doubt that trita is truthful about the conference call he mentions recently on twitter, and his mentioning it shows the sinister nature of america's government towards Iran.

Incidentally rudi bakhtiar has voiced her opposition to the Iran nuclear deal after global zero launched their video involving jack black, morgan freemen, lisa halaby/queen noor and valerie plame spewing their propaganda about backing the Iran nuclear deal.

Iran deal connection to the Tsarnayevs demonstrating government/police infiltration

Yesterday a rally organized by rashin khosravi and mass peace action close to john kerry's pickney st. house in support of the Iran nuclear deal was poorly attended, and conspicuously absent was raisin and her family

When I checked rashin's Facebook page I noticed two things that were conspicuous.

1.  There were no photos of her or any she took of yesterday's poorly attended rally in support of the Iran nuclear deal.

2.  There is a picture of her kids with her husband harold physic eating at the same restaurant in Watertown Square where Tamerlan Tsarnayev and I used to hang out at, even spar at

That restaurant was made famous by the photo taken below by a Tsarnayev supporter

Interestingly enough elena trey not only has not gone to any of the places where Tamerlan and I frequented, she ignored the throw down I gave john b welles and those he had on his show claiming the Tsarnayev raid was a hoax

Excellent proof of government/police infiltration in the greater boston area, and how the government is running scared of it's own population.

Odd Iran nuclear deal event in Boston

Odd how mass peace action created this event hours after the deal was reached regarding Iran's nuclear program
https://www.facebook.com/events/434287470077750/
Most terrifying is the fact that steve kirschbaum and steve gillis, the leaders of the Boston chapter of the workers world party, have been invited to this, the former who has been threatening Iranians who do not agree with his marxist-stalinist views, and the latter helping him execute those threats.

Most disturbing is that one of the organizers is raisin khosravi, wife of watertown pig tony physic, who told Iranians not to testify against steve kirschbaum during his recent trial, and the same one I beat up at the niac event in June in Watertown when he made trouble.

Check the list of people invited and you will notice people with police/military backgrounds, so in all probability their inviting kirschbaum and gillis dempnstrates that workers world boston are government-police provocateurs. I am amazed they do NOT support the Workers of Russia, China, and other countries Iran does arms deals with, as the deal sanctions Iran from importing weapons even for defense. They even ignore the workers in Iran's military/industrial base who have to work harder to defend Iran.
More disturbing is that raisin shared an article by William Beeman about the nuke deal. Dr. Beeman is close to my cousin Homa Khanoum, who livers near physic and khosravi's 731 Belmont St. address, so it is possible they may be threatening my relatives who oppose this deal.

The true implications of the Iran nuclear deal

The wording of this deal, which can be found at the link below, is so vague and unspecific, that any minor infraction can be used as pretext to attack Iran and renege on sanctions.  Expect this deal not to be ratified by Iran or any of the powers, and expect sanctions to come back again. Expect zarif and rouhani to be in the hot seat for this as well.


 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Vienna, 14 July 2015

PREFACE

The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom

and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this

hi

storic Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran’s

nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in

their approach to this issue.

They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA

will po

sitively contribute to regional and international

peace and security. Iran

reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any

nuclear weapons.

Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively

peaceful,

indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic

considerations, in

accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building

confidence and encouraging

international cooperation. In this context,

t

he initial mutually determined limitations

described in this JCPOA will be

followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of

Iran’s peaceful nuclear

programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial

programme f

or

exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non

-

proliferation

norms.

The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively

allow them

to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s

programme. T

he JCPOA

reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent

with practical needs, with agreed

limits on the scope of Iran’s nuclear

programme, including enrichment activities and R&D.

The JCPOA addresses the

E3/EU+3’s concerns, inclu

ding through comprehensive measures providing for

transparency and verification.

The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council

sanctions as

well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear

programme, i

ncluding

steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and

energy.

PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

i.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the

Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High

Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)

have decided upon this long

-

term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

(JCPOA).

This JCPOA, reflecting a step

-

by

-

step approach, includes the reciprocal

commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to

be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

ii.

The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful

nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

iii.

Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or

acquire any nuclear weapons.

iv.

Successful implementation of this JCP

OA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right

to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the

nuclear Non

-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and

the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the sa

me manner as that of

any other non

-

nuclear

-

weapon state party to the NPT.

v.

This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council

sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear

programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and

energy.

vi.

The E3

/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles

of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.

vii.

The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the

nuclear non

-

proliferation regime and the essential

foundation for the pursuit of

nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

viii.

The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a

constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any

action inc

onsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would

undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from

imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the

sanctions and restrictive measures co

vered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on

the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24

November 2013.

ix.

A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to

monitor the implementation of this JCPOA

and will carry out the functions

provided for in this JCPOA.

This Joint Commission will address issues arising

from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the

provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.

x.

The Internationa

l Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and

verify the voluntary nuclear

-

related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The

IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors,

and as provided for in this JCPOA, to t

he UN Security Council.

All relevant rules

and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be

fully observed by all parties involved.

xi.

All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of

its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as

setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of

international law and the ri

ghts and obligations under the NPT and other

relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and

practices.

xii.

Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the

annexes to this document.

xiii.

The EU and E3

+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will

cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and

engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in

Annex III, including through

IAEA inv

olvement.

xiv.

The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing

this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in

its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new

relationship w

ith Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for

the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous

resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of

consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by

the UN Security Council 10 years after

the Adoption Day.

xv.

The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective

durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.

xvi.

The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier

if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate

decisions by consensus.

I.

Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures w

ithin the timeframe as

detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes

NUCLEAR

A.

ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES

1.

Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium

enrichment and uranium enrichment

-

related activities incl

uding certain

limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8

years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next

stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described

in Annex I.

Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its

own long

-

term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of

the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran’s Safeguards

Agreement.

2.

Iran will begin phasing out its IR

-

1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period,

Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed

uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR

-

1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and

enrichment

-

related in

frastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA

continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.

3.

Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not

accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years

will only

include IR

-

4, IR

-

5, IR

-

6 and IR

-

8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and

Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of

uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR

-

6 and IR

-

8

centrifuges, and will comme

nce testing of up to 30 IR

-

6 and IR

-

8 centrifuges

after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.

4.

As Iran will be phasing out its IR

-

1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or

assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will r

eplace

failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture

advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA.

From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to

manufacture agre

ed numbers of IR

-

6 and IR

-

8 centrifuge machines without

rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA

continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long

-

term enrichment

and enrichment R&D plan.

5.

Based on its long

-

term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium

enrichment

-

related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the

Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%,

and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium e

nrichment and uranium enrichment

R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.

6.

Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology

centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint

partnerships will be es

tablished in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR

-

1

centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these

cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through

appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable

isotope production.

The other

four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other

centrifuges and enrichment

-

related infrastructure will be removed and stored

under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.

Glaring errors by US Naval Institute on World Navies

In their International Fleet review in the March 2015 issue of Proceedings the US Naval Institute made many mistakes about the activities of the World’s Navies, many of them glaring.

In the case of Iran they ignore there are three Jamaran class FFG’s under construction, one in Khorramshahr, two in Bandar Abbas.  They also ignore the acquisition of the Aquitaine class DDG Tahya Misr by Egypt from France, the Israeli deal to acquire two Sachsen class DDG’s from Germany, the Turkish Juan Carlos I variant Amphibious Carrier under construction in Tuzla, the Algerian Navy acquiring two Russian Steregushchy class and three Chinese Bengbu class FFG’s.

They also wrongly assume that India is seeking more American weapons, when in fact India has not been satisfied with American material since the USS Trenton/INS Jalashva LPD acquisition.  They also ignore that all three Kolkata class DDG’s are operational, the INS Kolkata is simply the only one commissioned, and they ignore the new Visakhapatnam class DDG’s, with the INS Visakhapatnam being launched and INS Porbandar under construction.  India also has commissioned the first two Arihant class SSBN’s, and the progress on the Supercarriers India is building, with INS Vikrant almost complete and INS Vishul commencing construction.  Most glaringly, they ignore the fact India has been exporting warships to other countries over the past few years, namely Sri Lanka and Mauritius.  Indonesia is also becoming an exporter, building two Makassar class LPD’s for the Philippines and instructing Peru how to build two Makassar class LPD’s, while purchasing two FFG’s from the Netherlands.  Australia has already launched the HMAS Hobart DDG, simply allowing the Canberra class Amphibious Carriers to be completed first.  Japan has already commissioned the JDS Izumo and has commenced construction on the second Izumo class Carrier.  China has already completed two Type 55 class DDG’s, and is collaborating with Singapore on building Aircraft Carriers.

No mention is made of Russia’s two Admiral Gorshkov class DDG’s which have been launched, or the full status on the joint Amphibious Carrier with France.  The full status of the production of the Aquitaine class DDG’s is ignored, as is the two Baden-Wuerttemberg class DDG’s Germany has launched, the new Multirole Command/Logistical Ship KNM Maud Norway is acquiring from South Korea, or the fact that all Venezuelan Mariscal Sucre class FFG”s are now operational.

The US Naval Institute needs to better check it’s facts.  Had they checked directly from satellite images and the websites of other countries as I have done they would not have made these mistakes.