The true implications of the Iran nuclear deal
The wording of this deal, which can be found at the link below, is so
vague and unspecific, that any minor infraction can be used as pretext
to attack Iran and renege on sanctions. Expect this deal not to be ratified by Iran or any of the powers, and
expect sanctions to come back again. Expect zarif and rouhani to be in
the hot seat for this as well.
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Vienna, 14 July 2015
PREFACE
The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this
hi
storic Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran’s
nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in
their approach to this issue.
They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA
will po
sitively contribute to regional and international
peace and security. Iran
reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any
nuclear weapons.
Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively
peaceful,
indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic
considerations, in
accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building
confidence and encouraging
international cooperation. In this context,
t
he initial mutually determined limitations
described in this JCPOA will be
followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of
Iran’s peaceful nuclear
programme, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial
programme f
or
exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non
-
proliferation
norms.
The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively
allow them
to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s
programme. T
he JCPOA
reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent
with practical needs, with agreed
limits on the scope of Iran’s nuclear
programme, including enrichment activities and R&D.
The JCPOA addresses the
E3/EU+3’s concerns, inclu
ding through comprehensive measures providing for
transparency and verification.
The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council
sanctions as
well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear
programme, i
ncluding
steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and
energy.
PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS
i.
The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)
have decided upon this long
-
term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA).
This JCPOA, reflecting a step
-
by
-
step approach, includes the reciprocal
commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to
be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.
ii.
The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran's nuclear programme.
iii.
Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or
acquire any nuclear weapons.
iv.
Successful implementation of this JCP
OA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right
to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the
nuclear Non
-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and
the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the sa
me manner as that of
any other non
-
nuclear
-
weapon state party to the NPT.
v.
This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council
sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear
programme, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and
energy.
vi.
The E3
/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.
vii.
The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the
nuclear non
-
proliferation regime and the essential
foundation for the pursuit of
nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
viii.
The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a
constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any
action inc
onsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would
undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from
imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the
sanctions and restrictive measures co
vered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on
the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24
November 2013.
ix.
A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to
monitor the implementation of this JCPOA
and will carry out the functions
provided for in this JCPOA.
This Joint Commission will address issues arising
from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the
provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.
x.
The Internationa
l Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and
verify the voluntary nuclear
-
related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The
IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors,
and as provided for in this JCPOA, to t
he UN Security Council.
All relevant rules
and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be
fully observed by all parties involved.
xi.
All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of
its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as
setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of
international law and the ri
ghts and obligations under the NPT and other
relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and
practices.
xii.
Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the
annexes to this document.
xiii.
The EU and E3
+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will
cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and
engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in
Annex III, including through
IAEA inv
olvement.
xiv.
The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing
this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in
its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new
relationship w
ith Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for
the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous
resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of
consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by
the UN Security Council 10 years after
the Adoption Day.
xv.
The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective
durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.
xvi.
The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier
if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate
decisions by consensus.
I.
Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures w
ithin the timeframe as
detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes
NUCLEAR
A.
ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES
1.
Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium
enrichment and uranium enrichment
-
related activities incl
uding certain
limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8
years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next
stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described
in Annex I.
Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its
own long
-
term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of
the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement.
2.
Iran will begin phasing out its IR
-
1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period,
Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed
uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR
-
1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and
enrichment
-
related in
frastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA
continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.
3.
Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not
accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years
will only
include IR
-
4, IR
-
5, IR
-
6 and IR
-
8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and
Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of
uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR
-
6 and IR
-
8
centrifuges, and will comme
nce testing of up to 30 IR
-
6 and IR
-
8 centrifuges
after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.
4.
As Iran will be phasing out its IR
-
1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or
assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will r
eplace
failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture
advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA.
From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to
manufacture agre
ed numbers of IR
-
6 and IR
-
8 centrifuge machines without
rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA
continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long
-
term enrichment
and enrichment R&D plan.
5.
Based on its long
-
term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium
enrichment
-
related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the
Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%,
and, at Fordow, refrain from any uranium e
nrichment and uranium enrichment
R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.
6.
Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology
centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint
partnerships will be es
tablished in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR
-
1
centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of these
cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through
appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable
isotope production.
The other
four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other
centrifuges and enrichment
-
related infrastructure will be removed and stored
under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.
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